In these days when we are starting to see the effects of the hot conflict in the Caucasus and the ensuing cold competition in relations between Russia and Turkey, we see that these relations are troubled, independent of the first one, by another crisis: the one over customs procedures. 

 

This customs crisis with Russia has several dimensions that should be addressed one by one.

 

How can we define the problem?

 

Turkish trucks and produce -- even if they are coming through Europe -- are routed to the red channel at Russian border gates, against customary tariff procedures, and all the items in the trucks are exhaustively checked and counted. As this takes a long time, there are delays in the delivery of Turkish goods to their destinations inside Russia.

 

Link between the customs crisis and the war in the Caucasus

 

This crisis we are having with Russia over customs procedures is not directly connected to the war in the Caucasus. Indeed, this crisis emerged before the start of the war and is gradually becoming more complicated. If we perceive this crisis as a direct consequence of the war, we will fail to see the main reason for the problem. This crisis is the outcome of the failure by the two countries to mutually organize their border gates and create a green channel, a project that started in early 2008. Unfortunately, this crisis coincided with the war and it seemed that it erupted when Turkey allowed US and NATO vessels to have access to the Black Sea.

 

Declaration of the embargo

 

Russia has never declared explicitly or implicitly that it has imposed an embargo on Turkey. Everyone knows that this is actually an embargo, a “warning shot” against Turkey. Yet this has never been acknowledged by Russia. For this reason, it is not a diplomatically correct move to openly declare and impose an embargo. If an implicit embargo is being imposed on you, then you will say that you are aware of the embargo and that you want to solve the problem through negotiations. If the problem cannot be solved in this way, then you will inform the other party in diplomatic language that you will retaliate. However, in doing so, you have to use a well-defined diplomatic language. Making statements hastily and in a blunt manner with respect to international relations tends to restrict room for maneuver and harm the one making the statement.

 

What tools cannot be used in retaliating against this implicit embargo?

 

First, we must note that in order to impose an embargo against Russia, you must know Russia well. You must know what will do harm to Russia. Russia is not like Turkey. In Turkey, the private sector, business firms and even truck drivers can exert some pressure on the government. This is not so in Russia, as the public and the firms have no means of forcing the Russian government to do anything. For this reason, if you target Russian companies, this will only affect Russian companies as well as your own firms. The impact of your actions will be limited to firms. This will not push the Russian government to act in the desired manner.

 

You cannot wage a competition with Russia purely on the basis of economic and commercial relations. The nature of your bilateral economic and commercial relations with Russia will not allow this. In such a confrontation, it will be our side that will suffer the greatest damage.

 

When we examine the trade volume between the two countries, we will clearly see the great imbalance against Turkey’s interests. In 2007 Turkey’s exports to Russia were about $4.7 billion, while our imports from Russia were about $23.5 billion. For the first six months of this year, Turkey’s exports were worth about $3.4 billion, while its imports amounted to about $16.4 billion. In the first four months of 2008, our total trade volume with Russia amounted to about $12.8 billion, which has made Russia Turkey’s top trade partner, followed by Germany, which was traditionally Turkey’s top trade partner in the past. Given the foreign trade volume, an embargo imposed by Turkey would be expected to be effective under normal conditions. However, this is not the case. Indeed, when we examine the nature of our imports and exports, we see that the goods we sell to Russia can be ignored and/or substituted by Russians. On the other hand, we cannot waive or substitute the goods we import from Russia, as the major items in our imports are oil and natural gas. In our rapidly improving commercial relations with Russia, we are planning to hit the $38 billion target. Russian foreign trade is generally characterized by surplus. Last year, Russia’s exports amounted to $353 billion vis-a-vis its imports, amounting to $200 billion. Turkey ranks fourth in Russia’s exports and 14th in its imports.

 

We must note that Turkey buys 40 percent of its oil and 60 percent of its natural gas from Russia. We cannot dismiss these goods we import from Russia just for the sake of an embargo. In other words, as winter approaches, we cannot tell Russia that we are not going to buy oil or natural gas from it.

 

How can we ‘disturb’ Russia?

 

In order to “intimidate” Russia, we must present it with geopolitical incentives, not trade-related ones. At this point, we must note that Turkey’s geopolitical weapons are the most effective “weapon” in the region. However, as Russian foreign policy is accustomed to flexing its muscles in times of crisis -- a USSR legacy -- such attempts might be counterproductive, so they must be carefully devised.

 

Geopolitical position

 

In an article I wrote about two years ago, I had said: “The Black Sea is the only sea that the US cannot have access to. US access to the Black Sea has been prevented by the joint efforts of Turkey and Russia. For this reason, Russia is well aware of the importance of the Black Sea and Turkey in this region. Of the countries on the coast of the Black Sea, Georgia and Ukraine have assumed an anti-Russian attitude. Bulgaria and Romania are pro-American, though they are not openly anti-Russian. The remaining country neighboring Russia is Turkey and it is neutral. The fact that the straits are controlled by Turkey, that Turkey has the longest coast line on the Black Sea, that it has the biggest military force in the Black Sea and that it neighbors both Europe and Caucasus gives Turkey great strategic and geopolitical supremacy. Even Turkey’s neutrality is a great advantage for Russia. If Turkey pursues a pro-Western policy, this may turn the Black Sea into a NATO and US/Western sea in the blink of an eye, which is the least desirable thing for Russia. For this reason, Russia is obliged to be extremely careful in its moves against Turkey. Russia must be reminded that it should not test the limits of Turkey’s patience. Russia can be expected to understand this in the shortest time possible.

 

Slowdown at the Straits

 

Another sanction that can be expected to be effective against Russia is related to passage through the Turkish straits. If the straits are closed to Russian tankers and vessels -- which should not be seen as direct closure, but should instead take the form of a slowdown in procedures related to passage through the straits-- Russia’s big oil corporations may suffer losses. Only such corporations can put some pressure on the government.

 

WTO

 

As the issue of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a casual item in the arsenal of embargo and deterrence frequently employed by Western countries -- and even Georgia -- against Russia, this “weapon” will not be very effective. A couple of countries will be eager to use it before we attempt to do so. Russia is already aware of this weapon and, to counteract, it has boldly told those who may resort to it to “do their best.”

 

Turkish and Muslim populations inside Russia

 

Using this card in bilateral relations is least desirable and it is a last resort. In the 1990s Turkey used this card occasionally, but ended up doing too much damage to bilateral relations, and tempting Russia to use other cards, particularly the Kurdish one. This card can be based on developing relations with Azerbaijan, Turkic countries in central Asia and Turkish and Muslim zones inside Russia, which has a Muslim population of 20 million. Yet, it should never forgotten that Turkey tried this card in the past and saw that, in return, Russia used the Kurdish card effectively. Thus, using this potentially dangerous card is not advisable. Actually, relations between the two countries are not likely to worsen to that extent.

 

As in the former crisis over Turkey’s vegetable and fresh fruit imports to Russia, this crisis, too, is likely to solved soon. This is an unfortunate habit in bilateral relations, but even such a small crisis such as the one concerning vegetable imports was solved after the prime ministers stepped in. We can expect the same thing to happen with regard to this current crisis. The policy of a controlled stepping-up of crises, which Russia has learned from Iran, leads to escalated tensions in the region. If there was no war in the Caucasus, this crisis would be no different from the previous one. Therefore, both parties should be cautious in such delicate times.

 

In general, the countries that face embargos tend to reinforce their weak sides and decrease foreign dependence by increasing their local production. Actually, this is what Russia is planning to do. Russia has concerns about being dependent on other countries, particular for foodstuffs, and it is seeking an opportunity to eliminate its weakness in this area. Given the fact that World War II played a great role in the formation of the psychological mood of the Russian people, any embargo on Russia will give the Russian government, guided by Putin, a good chance to promote the local production of previously imported goods.