The long history of the Russo-Turkish relations is a vast area, which covers more than 500 years of official interaction. This long history of relations between Russia and Turkey is full of negative perceptions, suspicions, misunderstandings and resentments on each side. For the Russians, the memory of so-called “Tatar Yoke”, the image of Sultan as the oppressor of Orthodox peoples and the late Ottoman aspirations of pan-Turkism directed against Russian territorial integrity, are important factors in the Russian view of perceptions of Turks. For the Turkish side, the image of imperialist Russians putting the Ottomans an a continuous retreat southward is strengthened by the Soviet policies over the Turkish nations of the USSR.

  Although the effect of the co-operation during the period Lenin and Ataturk had a positive effect on other’s image, it was short-lived. Following a relatively cordial period leading up to World War II, the USSR and Turkey found themselves at odds in the form of Cold War. Up until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russo-Turkish relations were a mere extension of a much larger game in the politics of the Cold War. During Cold War, both the USSR and Turkey saw each other as enemies in adversary ideological camps and military alliances. Mutual perceptions began to change in the positive direction only in 1980s when Gorbachev’s policies increased transparency of the outer membrane of the USSR, and peaked with the intensification of trade and tourism especially in the second half of the 1990s.

  Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russo-Turkish relations once more captured international attention to the extent that there was almost a return to the dramatic days of the 19^th and 19^th centuries. In sharp contrast to the tranquility of the Cold War era, talk of regional rivalries, revived “Great Games” in Eurasia, confrontations in the Caucasus and Central Asia captured the imagination of strategists, international experts, political scientists and historians.[1] Turkey’s role as Russia’s natural geopolitical rival was discovered. The question regarding the future of Russo-Turkish relations was posed as followed: Which would ultimately prevail, geopolitics, and geo-strategy or geo-economics?

  It was argued in Russia that Ankara was only eager to take revenge upon Moscow for its historical defeats and, by easing Russia out of its former provinces, recreate a neo-Ottoman sphere of influence from Balkans to Lake Balkash, Kazakhstan. ‘Pan-Turkism’ is dreaded along with ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, Turkish involvement is suspected in Chechnya, and Turkish influence is seen as making inroads in Tatarstan and Crimea.[2] Most members of the Russia political class has viewed Turkey as one of the beneficiaries of the Soviet collapse. Although pro-Western oriented leaders saw Ankara as a stabilizing force in the former Soviet south, projecting benign Western influence, in the mid-90s most of the Russian politicians appeared to see Turkey not only an independent actor but also as a regional proxy of the remaining superpower, the United States.[3]

  After the demise of Marxism-Leninism, traditional geopolitics has become the new point of reference for Russia’s foreign policy. Russia saw Turkey as a formidable rival in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey’s quasi-alliance with Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia played an important role in Russia’s assessment of Turkey as a formidable rival. Moscow failed to create an alliance with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Geo-strategic issues constituted one another set of issues between Russia and Turkey. The regional military balance developed in favor of Turkey in Black Sea and the Southern Caucasus. After the disintegration of the USSR, the Black Sea became a NATO lake. As Russia and Ukraine were quarrelling over the division of the Black Sea fleet and status of Sevastopol, the Black Sea has become an area for NATO’S Partnership for Peace exercises. The officially proclaimed strategic partnership with Ukraine, which implied some form of response a Turkish challenge, is not working. The presence of Russian forces in Georgia is becoming problematic due to deadlock in solving Abkhaz conflict. Azerbaijan, its CIS membership notwithstanding, is seen as Turkey’s de facto ally. Russia was left with Armenia, with which even lacks a common border. In both Abkhazia and Karabakh, Russia has been unable to come with acceptable settlement formulas, has come under fires from both sides. The next sets of issues have been geopolitics with an economic ring. Russia and Turkey went through an intense rivalry regarding the oil and gas resources in the Caspian Basin and Central Asia.

  The collapse of the USSR, the end of the Cold war and the accelerated pace of European integration challenged the very foundations of Turkey’s traditional foreign policy. The rejection of Turkey’s bid to become a full member of the European Union caused a deep sense of isolation and insecurity on the part of the politicians in Turkey. This sense of isolation and insecurity played an important role in Turkey’s foreign policy formulation towards the newly independent Soviet republics. In this respect, Turkey viewed the disintegration of the USSR and the initial “power vacuum” in the southern post-Soviet territory as an opportunity to assert its ambitions and implement new policies in the region. This in turn would increase Turkey’s strategic value for the West. Such an engagement in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia was also highly vital for Turkey’s weak economy, since the region had not only a immense resources such as oil and gas but also a market for Turkey’s investors.[4]

  Turkey viewed the disintegration of the USSR and the initial “power vacuum” in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia as an opportunity to assert its ambitions and implement new policies. Ankara had to alter its traditional foreign policy conduct and define new strategies and goals concerning the region. Thus, Ankara did not loose time in stressing its ethnic, historical and cultural ties with the newly independent countries of the former Soviet south.  Ankara claimed for greater influence in the region with its Western-style democratic regime, secular state system, market economy, and the support from the West, especially the US.[5]

  After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia government did not show a direct in interests in the newly independent states of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. They were accepted as an impediment to economic, social and politic transformation in Russia.[6] Actually, the pro-Western government was right in the sense that the direct interest in their social, economic problems would be a direct burden on Russia. However, as we have seen, the difficulties in economic transformation, NATO’s eastward expansion, Turkey’s increasing interests in the Southern Caucasus states and Central Asia led nationalists and communists to gain more power among Russians in Russia. One another influential player was the Russian military. They were also not happy with the foreign policy of the pro-Western government in Russia. The pro-Western government and its economic, social and foreign policies were under a huge criticism.

  Following the domestic debate between the pro-Westerners and conservatives on the new character of the Russian state, its foreign policy priorities, methods of formulation and conduct, and mainly national interests, Russia reentered the post-Soviet space in a more assertive manner after 1992-1993.[7] Thus, the pro-Western policies were replaced with the inward and isolationists ones. Russia started to show a direct interest in the former Soviet Union republics. Russia started to project its economic, political, and military might to the “near abroad”; Caucasus and Central Asia. For Russia, another contender for the throne of the former Soviet Union territory was unacceptable and Turkey’s policies towards region were highly resented by the policymakers in Moscow. Russians implemented a though strategy to keep Turkey out of the borders of the CIS by partly promoting the integration process within the CIS and by partly showing the “stick” to Turkey. To push Turkey out of region, Russia also implemented power-balancing techniques by establishing close military relations with Armenia, Iran and Greece. [8]

  For the Russian Federation, Ankara was not simply another state that challenged its hegemony in the region, but it was a prolonged arm of NATO in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Furthermore, Ankara was the only member of NATO that was directly linked to the Soviet South with historical, cultural, religious and linguistic ties. In this respect, for Moscow, Ankara constituted a major threat to Russian existence in the region.

  At the beginning of 1990s, Russia and Turkey lived through an immense rivalry in the Southern Caucasus. Due to some factors, Turkey has been unsuccessful in gaining leadership role in the region. Ankara has focused on its own internal political and economic problems as well as on other foreign policy priorities in Europe and Middle East. The Islamist revival in Turkish politics, the Kurdish question, the tense relations with European Union, economic crisis prevented Turkey from actively engaging in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.[9] Like Turkey, Russia had also been troubled by its own political and economic troubles and was diverted in 1990s by competing foreign policy priorities, especially by its post-Cold War relationship with the US.

  In the mid-1990s, Russia appeared to perceive Turkey as a massive security challenge. For instance, The White Book of Russian Special Services (Moscow:Obozrevatel, 1996) described Turkey as an aspiring regional power that supports “Muslim movements” and cherishes “pan-Turkic ideas;” it also argued that Turkey might move into the “geo-strategic niche” in the Caucasus created by Russia’s weakening state. Moscow repeatedly accused Ankara of supporting –both morally and financially -the Chechen separatists during the first Chechen war. In this respect, as a response to Turkey involvement in the Southern Caucasus, Sergey Karaganov, councilor of the President of Russian Federation stated in 1996: “These places are Russia’s backyard. Nobody can play in these fields without Russia’s consent.”[10]

  Although the Russian Federation and Turkey had conflicting interests in the region, the post-Soviet Russian-Turkish relations displayed a pattern in which both countries, despite their mutual perception of each other as formidable region in the region, they refrained from using rhetoric reminding of the Cold War era. Although policies of Russia and Turkey openly clashed in some issues, such as Nagarno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Caspian pipelines, CFE flank limits on the Caucasus, persistent Russian military presence in Georgia, Armenia on Turkish borders and Checnya, etc, Moscow and Ankara paid extreme caution on not allowing the tensions spill over the whole of the bilateral relations. Although occasional aggravations observed in relations on the issues such as the Balkan Wars in Bosnia (1991-1995) and Kosovo crisis in 1999, the tendency to isolate issues from each other led to normalization of relations between two historical rivals. The historic rivalry on Balkan conflicts did not cause serious negative repercussions on the rest of the bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey.

  The Russo-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era exhibited some sort of “dualism”. The relationship between Russia and Turkey in the post-Cold War context can be characterized by significant cooperation and conflict at the same time. Due to historical factors, in the long term, the management of relations with Russia is still a leading security issue for Turkey. However, the magnitude of Russian-Turkish trade and the need for coexistence at political level work against competitive policies.

  Professor Duygu Sezer of Bilkent University in Ankara described the Russian-Turkish relations in 1990s by the term “virtual rapprochement”, which refers to “a state of bilateral relations in which public manifestation of state-level adversity and hostility have nearly disappeared; the importance of cooperation in a range of fields for furthering respective national interests in mutually perceived and publicly articulated; governments desist from using inflammatory rhetoric so as not to arouse public hostility; officials keep the lines of communication in order to safeguard relations against the impact of sudden crisis.[11] As Sezer also pointed out, however, the historical mistrust, fear and suspicion remains prompt besides the urge of developing co-operation, in decision makers’ minds, keeping parties from proceeding a higher level of rapprochement, which would be characterized by intensive co-operation in the areas of security and economy.

  In the end of 1990s and later, Moscow fundamentally revised its perception of Turkey’s role in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia started to see Turkey as a valuable partner rather than a formidable threat. Two factors played an important role in this reassessment. The main reason behind this reassessment in the development of relationship between Russia and Turkey was gas. Turkey, along with Europe, is Russia’s major market for gas. Some of the largest energy business deals in Russia have been signed with Turkey. The recent completion of the Blue Stream gas pipeline under Black Sea will increase Turkey’s dependence on Russian natural gas from 66 percent up to 80 percent. Furthermore, Russia is beginning to see Turkey as a transit country for its energy resources rather than simply an export market.

  Moscow’s reevaluation of Turkish strategic potential was one another factor that changed the Moscow’s perception of Turkish activities in the post-Soviet land. By 2000-2001, a shift occurred whereby Turkey came to be normally portrayed not as a geopolitical challenger but as a weakening competitor, preoccupied with internal and economic troubles. The Russian Security Council, after a comprehensive reevaluation of security challenges, now perceives Turkey’s penetration into the Caucasus as a low-intensity risk, and the sharp political and economic crisis in Turkey in February-March of 2001 only confirmed these assessments.

  In this new period in Russo-Turkish relations, Moscow have appeared to have been keen to send some friendly signals to Turkey regarding the change in Russia’s perception of its former formidable adversary. The Russian Ambassador to Ankara, Alexander Lebedev stressed the unique “Eurasian nature” of both countries and said that the relations between Russia and Turkey have evolved from the stage of competition to that of cooperation in multidimensional areas. The Russian senior diplomat has also tried to prove the historic stereotypes wrong. The common historic impression that the Russians and Ottoman empires have been in a state of war most of the time is untrue. He referred to the joint study conducted by Russian and Turkish historians that allegedly revealed that out of 500 years of relationship the tsars and sultans were engaged in direct conflict for only 25 years. He also added that Russia and Turkey set up alliances in the past against British and the French.[12]

  There have been also remarkable shifts with regard to competition over the Caspian oil export pipeline routes. In practice, until recently, Russia and Turkey had been rivals with regard to the transportation of oil to the Western markets. By mid-2001, The Russian government dropped its opposition to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. Instead of trying to block the project, Russian has taken final steps towards finishing the construction of the high-capacity Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline. Russia also encouraged the Russian firms to take part in the so-called Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. [13]

  Moscow clearly prefers to present the oil transportation issue in geo-economic rather than geopolitical terms, putting cost-efficiency ahead of balance of power and emphasizing competition between economic actor rather than struggle for spheres of influence with Turkey and the US. Now, Russian under Putin clearly follows a very pragmatic policy regarding this issue. Now, private economic interests are making real impact on Russia’s foreign policy.[14] There are even Russian proposals on establishing Russo-Turkish pipelines between Russia and Turkey in order to carry the oil in the Caspian Basin and Central Asia.  While some anxiety about Turkish and American activities and intentions in the Caspian area still remains in many of Moscow’s political quarters, there is also predominant line toward avoiding confrontational paradigms on this transportation issue.

  As to ethnic conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, Russia and Turkey, today, support the direct dialogue between the parties. Although Russia and Turkey have some differences on how to bring a solution to the ethnic conflicts in the region, the two countries showed interests in establishing “Caucasus Stability Pact” for peace and security.[15]

  The potential for competition between Russia and Turkey, of course, not totally disappeared. Ankara is wary about the operation of Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia. Some top military officials in Turkey consider these bases as a source of potential threat. Turkey also would like to see the so-called CIS peacekeeping forces in the South Caucasus conflict zones replaced by international forces, since these peacekeeping contingents are almost exclusively manned by Russian military.

  Russia also obviously displeased with Turkeys military and security officials’ cooperation with their counterparts in Georgia and Azerbaijan.  In January 2002 in Ankara, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey concluded a tripartite agreement on regional security. Georgia’s military contacts with Turkey make Moscow especially unhappy. A particular irritant is Turkey assistance in modernizing the Marneuli air base near Tbilisi. In addition, in October 2002 a Turkish military delegation arrived in Tbilisi to attend the formal opening of the United Military Academy that had been set up and co-staffed by members of the Turkish armed forces.

  Continuing cooperation between Russia and Turkey, however, counterbalanced this confrontational trend in Russo-Turksi relations. Russia and Turkey today reached an “unprecedently high level of trade and economic cooperation,” Igor Ivanov, head of the Russian foreign ministry, said upon the conclusion of official visit in Turkey. Ivanov also pointed out that economic relations would lead Russia and Turkey to cooperate at the international, regional and bilateral levels. Moreover, Ivanov stressed that both countries are “Eurasian states” which, he said, provides grounds for active and fruitful cooperation. [16]

This cooperation is not only limited to the construction or gas sectors. Turkey is the first NATO member that in the 1990s started to purchasing Russian arms, helicopters, armored personnel carriers for the use against the PKK militants in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Rosvooruzhenie has offered co-production of Russia’s best attack helicopter, the KA-50 Black Shark in the early 2000s. Contacts in this area have increased especially with the signing of the “Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Military Field and Agreement on Cooperation of Training of Military Personnel” signed in January 2002 during the visit of General Kvashin, Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation in January 2002. The visit of Chief of Staff of Turkey General Huseyin Kivrikoglu in June 2002 to Moscow was another milestone in shaping the two countries in military field.[17]

  Despite clashing interests, Turkey saw Russia as a possible partner in an alternative alignment in Europe, after of frustration of European Luxembourg summit in 1999. The Luxembourg summit showed once more that Turkey would not be accepted as a full member of European Union in near future. In this atmosphere, a top Turkish general Kilinc Pasha suggested that Turkey should turn its back on Europe and embrace strategic alternatives. General Kilinc Pasha expressed frustration at EU’s policies towards Turkey, and said Ankara needed new allies. In this context, he singled out Russia as a potential strategic partner. General Kilinc’s suggestions triggered a heated public debate in Turkey. Many believed in Turkey that General Kilinc’s words reflected a tendency that prevails at the higher ranks of the Turkish armed forces.[18]

   Turkey’s place in the international politics is highly depends on its relations with the US and European Union. In Turkish foreign policy, the issue of being a full member of the European Union (EU) takes an importance place. The successive governments in 1990s followed a very strict policy to become a member of the European Union.  As was seen during the Luxembourg summit in 1999 and Copenhagen summit in 2002, the European Union countries, however, are not keen on accepting Turkey as a full member in the organization. The EU countries and Turkey have some differences regarding many political issues, such as Cyprus, and Kurdish Question. Turkey is unlikely to give in such issues under the EU criticism. The EU refusals to accept Turkey as a full member created certain fears in Turkey regarding country’s security and economic well-being. While some argue that Turkey should develop its relations with the US, others argued that Turkey should continue on insisting on EU membership.

In this context, Turkey’s relations with Russian Federation take an important place. Russian Federation, although, still boasts a massive nuclear arsenal and continues to be a great power with formidable might and potential. Today, Russia under Putin follow a very pragmatic foreign policy and very keen on establishing relations with Turkey in many fields ranging from politics to economy. Turkey can cooperate in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Black Sea basin.

The recent EU refusal to nominate Turkey as a full member created upheavals in Turkey again. Immediately after the EU summit in Copenhagen in 2002, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Moscow and emphasized the importance of Russia as  an alternative in Turkey’s future politic orientations.[19]

Throughout 1990s, Russia and the Western countries had so many policy differences regarding NATO’s expansion, war in Yugoslavia in 1991-1995 and Kosovo crisis in 1999. The US involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia had been one another source of tensions between Moscow and Washington. During this period, Russia and Turkey had conflicting views regarding these issues.

The September 11 attacks of 2001 in the USA changed the geopolitical situation in the world and dramatically affected the region, namely the Caucasus and Central Asia. Joint fighting against terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism emerged as new areas where Russia and the Western countries, especially the US can cooperate effectively. Today, Russia and the US have established a partnership in fighting against international terrorism.

It was the post 11 September US-led anti-terrorist coalition that actually placed Russia and Turkey on the same major side. Neither Russia nor Turkey took part in the actual fighting in Afghanistan, but Russia was essential for providing the necessary intelligence to the US and for supplying the Afghan Northern-Alliance with weapons and material. Now, Russia and Turkey play an important role for pacification of Afghanistan.

In its changing foreign policy attitudes, Moscow chose not to contest a US military presence in the southern republics of the former Soviet Union. Moscow reluctantly accepted the presence of US and Western European forces in Central Asia as a part of the military operation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

In this context, the Caucasus as whole carries an important place in war against terrorism. Now, the US and Turkey supports Russia in its war against terrorists in the Caucasus, namely in Chechnya. The other Western countries, namely Germany, France and others clearly support the Russia’s war against terrorists in the Caucasus as well. Now, Russia does not strictly oppose to the US plans to establish military bases in Georgia in the name of war against international terrorism. This has no doubt has a positive impact on the Russo-Turkish relations.

The US led anti-terrorist campaign and ironically, the second Chechen war, resulted in a major realignment of forces in southwestern Asia. Prior to 2000, one could talk about the formation of rival “axes”, one involving Russia, Armenia, and Iran, and the other linking Turkey, Israel and Azerbaijan, and supported by the US. This is no longer credible. Now, Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia are in alignment with the US against international terrorism.

Now, Russia and Western countries found a room where they can cooperate for the sake peace and stability in the world. This cooperation seems to spill over other areas. In this respect, the recent NATO-Russian summit, which was held in the Italian capital, Rome, was an important development. At the meetings, the heads of states and governments of allied countries signed a document called the “Rome Declaration” concerning the establishment of NATO-Russian Council. The declaration envisages comprehensive cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation. The declaration includes issues such as the struggle against terrorism, reduction in the number of weapons of mass destruction, cooperation against new threats, strengthening mutual confidence, controlling armament, joint planning for emergency civilian needs, reforms in defense systems and military cooperation, joint rescue operations at sea and defense cooperation.[20] Turkey warmly welcomes the establishment of the NATO-Russian Council.

Now, Russia and Turkey accept each other not as rival but as a partner to cooperate in many fields. In this context, the signing of a bilateral document by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem on 16 November is not accidental. The Action Plan for Developing Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey in Eurasia is an agreement of great importance for both countries and the region. The preamble to this document stated that “fundamental changes of historical dimensions have opened a new stage for interactions between Turkey and Russia, characterized by new opportunities in developing fruitful bilateral and regional co-operation in all spheres in the spirit of friendship and mutual trust. The necessity of employing all the available means for developing co-operation in economic, trade, energy, transportation, tourism, environment protection and other spheres is emphasized the Action Plan among the most important directions for a renewed Russian-Turkish cooperation. Two sides agree that strengthening trade and economic cooperation between them in Eurasia will be a driving force for advancing bilateral co-operation and leading to diverse partnership.[21] In other words, Russia and Turkey are aiming to bring bilateral co-operation to a higher level of interaction within the Caucasus and Central Asia. Through gradual and thoughtful implementation of the Action Plan, it will be possible to carry rich experience of Russian-Turkish bilateral cooperation beyond the borders of Russia and into the borders of the CIS.

In conclusion, we see that despite Russia’s and Turkey’s long-term competing agendas, Russia and Turkey getting closer to each other and sides are open to co-operation in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Surely, such a warm atmosphere in relations will spill over other areas in the near future.