In this paper, the impact of Turkey on the foreign and security policies of European Union by referring to certain crucial developments in the EU, such as enlargement will be given. In that respect first of all the evolution and main historical development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) will be summarized. Then impact of Turkey to EU’s CFSP and ESDP, both as a “security producer” and “security consumer” will be analyzed together with Turkey’s candidate status in the EU.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CFSP/ESDP OF THE EU
The historical evolution of a European foreign and security policy can even be dated back to the formation of European Defense Community (EDC) by 1952 and European Political Community (EPC) in 1970s. “EPC had been devised essentially along the lines of the Gaullist Fouchet Plan: that is, expressly to prevent Brussels becoming a foreign policy centre…Foreign policy would and could remain a national competence” (Allen, 1998, p.48). EPC was rather based on moderate and pragmatist objectives. It proved to be successful in the areas of “soft security”, partially in the Middle East and in the formation of a more stable Europe.
Then by 1954 Western European Union (WEU) was established, but it coincided with the formation of NATO. Therefore NATO became more influential on the security policies of Western Europe especially rather than the WEU, but it did not make the WEU totally ineffective.
Even in 1970s, Henry Kissinger explained his concern of lack of a commonality and leadership in the EC as “When I call the Europe, who am I going to speak with?” (Allen, 1998, p.41).
Until 1980s, there were not crucial steps taken to a common EU foreign and security policy strategy, maybe the EU countries did not feel the necessity of it since EU was first proved to be an economic cooperation and as functionalist theory suggests with “spillover effect” EC/EU will become later develop a common political as well as security perspective. Another explanation comes from David Allen (1998, p.43), “While all the member states continue to seek prosperity and security in a changing international system, most of them appear to believe that they can achieve this without ceding further ‘sovereignty’ to the European construction. All appear to recognize that an effective EU will always exert more power and influence than any of them could aspire to individually” meaning that European countries acted reluctant towards building a more strong and integrated common foreign policy of the EU since it was limiting their national sovereignty.
By 1986, Single European Act (SEA) was signed which was crucial for the evolution of the CFSP and it was the first step of the Treaty Reform in the EU. Also soft security issues would be discussed under EPC according to it. WEU again gained importance as the defense arm of the EC.
SEA was one of the first major developments to form a European Union and political as well as economic sides of security become to be discussed in the EPC framework. Moreover they felt the necessity of forming a more coherent and integrated common foreign policy. With the SEA, Community and EPC pillars were separated. Even there was an emphasis of “common interests” of the Community.
By the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union in the beginning of 1990s, expectations from the EC/EU as an international actor increased both in the internal dimension and external front as stated by Christopher Hill (1998, p.19). However the EC/EU was far away from answering these expectations since it was dealing with traumatic “left-over” s of the end of Cold War such as the crisis in the Yugoslavia, unification of Germany and certain economic difficulties.
As a result, by 1993 Maastricht Treaty or Treaty on the European Union (TEU) came into force. It suggested that EU would be based on a three-pillar structure as 1.European Community Pillar, 2.Common Foreign and Security Policy Pillar and 3.Justice and Home Affairs Pillar. This was a major step on the way of formation of an effective CFSP of the EU and in fact for an effective European foreign policy, not only the CFSP pillar but all three pillars should be taken into consideration. The aim was “…to create a firm bases for the construction of future Europe” (Allen, p.50). Moreover the predominant role of the Council in decision-making was enhanced with the Maastricht Treaty.
By the Petersberg Declaration of 1992, “Petersberg Tasks” of the EU were defined which were peacekeeping, peacemaking, crisis-management and crisis-prevention. Also WEU was defined as the defense arm of the Union.
In 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) concept inside NATO and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) were formed. The Berlin Ministerial Summit of 1996 was an important step in terms of the development of ESDI in the sense that NATO assets could be used in the European-led defense operations according to it.
Another important step was the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty of the EU. Due to the Amsterdam Treaty Petersberg Tasks were incorporated into the responsibility of the EU and WEU would become integrated with the EU. Moreover a post of High Representative for the CFSP was constructed with the Amsterdam Treaty, who is Javier Solana since October 1999 and this was an important step for the coordination of CFSP of the EU. On the other hand there were certain mechanisms such as “constructive abstention” in CFSP matters that made the adoption of concrete strategies in the EU more difficult. Also Treaty of Amsterdam was designed to cope with the institutional challenges of enlargement (especially 1995 Austria-Finland-Sweden enlargement), which is a crucial factor in the evolution of European security and foreign policies (Müftüler-Bac, 2000, pp.489-490).
Nice Treaty of 2000 dealt essentially “with Amsterdam left-over”s. Instead of “constructive abstention”, “enhanced cooperation” mechanism in CFSP was introduced. Also in terms of the security policy of the EU, a distinction was made between non-crisis vs. crisis arrangements and using NATO capabilities vs. non-using NATO capabilities. In this sense they tried a lot to facilitate an agreement between NATO and Turkey in terms of ESDP and usage of NATO assets (Missiroli, 2002, p.16).
There were certain summits that had crucial effects on the evolution of CFSP/ESDP which I want to mention very briefly.
1998 Saint Malo Summit was important since agreements on ESDP were signed. “At St.Malo, France and Britain decided to push the EU’s role in security and defense further and questioned the need for the existence of WEU as an independent organization” (Bağcı & Yıldız, 2004, p.80). In the Cologne Summit of 1999, new measures to ESDP were introduced. WEU was fully integrated to the EU. 1999 Helsinki Summit on the other hand stated that EU should have its “autonomous military capacity” to carry out the Petersberg Tasks in its “Headline Goal” and they decided to mobilize 60.000 soldiers by December 2003 for that reason (Karaosmanoğlu, 2001, p.160). Feira Summit of 2000 paved the way of possibility of non-EU European countries (like Turkey, Norway, Iceland) to participate in European operations if NATO assets are used.
TURKEY’S ROLE IN THE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES OF THE EU
Turkey is a candidate country on the way of EU membership, which will begin accession negotiations by 03.October.2005 and it is an associate member of EU since 1963 as well as member of NATO since 1952. Moreover Turkey is an associate member of the WEU.
In terms of the EU’s viewpoint about Turkey, 1999 Helsinki Summit was a turning point since Turkey was given a candidate status. With this decision the traditional “security consumer” perception of Turkey was replaced by “security producer” assets of Turkey.
In general, Turkey wants more participation in the foreign and security matters of the EU; it wants full and equal participation in decision-making processes of EU-led operations and on the usage of NATO assets in general. However “as for the institutional dimension of the ESDP, Turkey maintains that, as a non-EU European NATO member, it is left in a disadvantageous position in the new project when compared to its previous achievements…in WEU and NATO” (Bağcı & Yıldız, 2004, p.82). However the developments due to Helsinki, Cologne and Nice Summits decreased Turkish concerns a little bit.
What does EU think about Turkey’s position and demands in this sense? As stated above before Helsinki decision, only negative effects of Turkey to European foreign and security policies were considered, but by giving candidate status at Helsinki Summit of 1999 Turkey’s possible contributions to ESDP were also considered. Even though Turkey expressed its readiness in terms of military and political participation into European operations and decision-making mechanisms (Bağcı & Yıldız, 2004, p.89), EU is reluctant to do so. On the other hand Turkey, as a non-EU European NATO member, is an asset to European foreign and security process since EU still needs NATO in the military sense.
Now I want to summarize the “security consumer” and “security producer” arguments about Turkey’s role in the European security and foreign policies, especially in the CFSP/ESDP dimension:
*Turkey as a “security consumer”:
Turkey was seen as a security burden by many Europeans. Why? “Turkey’s direct involvement in Cyprus problem and the remaining potential of a new escalation of tensions with Greece and direct exposures to the instabilities in the Middle East and Caucasus may bring new security headaches to the Union” (Müftüler-Bac, 2000, p.490). These areas pose security challenges to the EU in terms of WMD, illegal trafficking of drugs and people and terrorism.
Moreover Turkey is seen also a security consumer due to its unstable economy, not having a full functioning democracy and since Turkey is stuck to the notion of “military security” rather than “civilian power” and EU is a “civilian power” in general (Bağcı & Yıldız, 2004, p.92).
Also inclusion of the Turkey inside the EU is a question of “identity” for the EU, because with the ESDI/ESDP initiatives of the EU it also raised a question of a separate EU security and defense identity. As stated in Karaosmanoğlu (2001, pp.163-164), EU bases its identity on its democracy and its democratic mission as well as “liberal interventionism”. Turkey as a different, less democratic and less stable country challenges this identity in some respect. “It is argued that Turkey stresses more the country’s strategic and military importance for a greater role in this project and neglects the relevance of identity in the ESDP project” (Bağcı & Yıldız, 2004, p.91).
*Turkey as a “security producer”:
On the other hand, Turkey can make important contributions to the CFSP/ESDP in the sense that with its huge population and economic potential, Turkey can contribute to the EU since Europe is getting older and they need human resource more than ever. As stated in Aydın & Açıkmeşe (2004, p.51), “The only tangible economic advantage of Turkey’s accession to the EU would be the inflow of Turkey’s young population to the member states to countermand their aging workforces”.
Moreover Turkey would have important political as well as institutional impacts in terms of voting and political representation when it becomes a full member of Europe since it would be the second largest country after Germany.
It is true that Turkey is surrounded with 3 security consuming zones, namely the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans, however by 9/11 terrorists attacks on the USA and Madrid bombings of March 2004 it was understood better that no country is safe from global threats and to be a global actor, EU should be active in these regions (Aydın & Açıkmeşe, 2004, p.53). Therefore EU can use Turkey’s presence in the region as an “asset” to become a more influential global actor.
Moreover “EU imports approximately 60 percent of its energy needs from Turkey’s neighboring regions and attaches utmost importance to secured access to these resources. Thus Turkey’s location at the crossroads of major new energy transport projects, long-established Iraqi oil pipelines to İskenderun, as well as the Turkish Straits linking the Black Sea and Mediterranean elevates Turkey to a vital position in the Union’s energy strategies” (Aydın & Açıkmeşe, 2004, p.54).
Nevertheless Turkey can contribute to the EU’s “Neighborhood Policy” since it has cultural, political, economic and historical ties and affinities in the region and this is again an important factor for a more effective CFSP/ESDP.
Also Turkey can contribute to CESDP with its second largest army in NATO and by providing deployable and sustainable EU forces. In fact, “Turkey has already been contributing to CESDP, first with its pledge to ERRF in November 2000 of 4.000-5.000 troops supported by air and naval components, and secondly by agreeing to the EU-NATO Declaration of 16 December 2002 and the Berlin-plus Agreements of 17 March 2003 that created a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, securing EU’s access to NATO’s assets and capabilities” (Aydın & Açıkmeşe, 2004, p.55).
As stated in Müftüler-Bac (2000, pp.498-499), Turkey can contribute to foreign relations of EU in the Middle East since its closeness to and alliance building with Israel and its previous role in the multilateral track of Middle East Peace Process; also in terms of EUROMED Partnership, relations with Balkans and energy corridor in the Caspian region. Turkey participated in the 1992-95 Bosnian crisis and 1998-99 Kosovo crisis by humanitarian relief under UN command and accommodating many refugees. In the Caspian region, as stated above it is an energy corridor for Europe. In terms of the EUROMED process, Turkey can be a good model with its secular democracy and dynamic economy.
Moreover USA also supports Turkey’s taking an active role in the ESDP (Terzi, 2002, p.49) and in terms of Transatlantic relations this is a crucial factor.
COMPROMISE WITH 2002 ANKARA DOCUMENT
Before the acceptance of the Ankara Document, Turkey, as a NATO member since 1952, vetoed EU access to NATO assets. They found a solution to it in December 2001 and by 2002 Brussels European Council Ankara Document was adopted. According to it, EU guaranteed that it would not intervene in the Aegean and Cyprus problems between Turkey and Greece. Moreover, Turkey would be consulted in the operations where NATO assets are used. In return, “Ankara Document accepted the concept of assured access of the EU to some pre-determined NATO assets” (Bağcı & Yıldız, 2004, p.94). These arrangements were further enhanced with December 2002 EU-NATO Strategic Partnership (Emerson & Tocci, 2004, p.1).
CONCLUSION
As a result, the Turkey is an asset for the European foreign, security as well as defense policies with its military capability, young and dynamic population and promising role in the “near neighborhood of the EU” and the EU should have understood this fact in the sense that it will start accession negotiations with Turkey by October 2005 due to the European Council decision on 17.December.2004. Of course there are certain “security producing” aspects of Turkey’s membership into EU, but “in the case of Europe, the geostrategic position, capabilities for the security of Europe, as well as the potential political, economic, demographic and cultural capacities of Turkey negates the potential costs of its would be EU membership” (Aydın & Açıkmeşe, 2004, p.58). Moreover this process also transformed Turkey’s internal dynamics through the implementation of Copenhagen criteria especially.
A stated in Emerson & Tocci (2004), Turkish membership is a test-case of Europe in terms of proving its credibility of policies towards the Middle East, Balkans, Mediterranean region and Caucasus and it will affect the credibility of the EU as a foreign policy actor as well.
References
Ali Karaosmanoğlu (2001). “Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-AB İlişkileri”. Doğu-Batı, 14, pp.155-166.
Antonio Missiroli (2002). “EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis-Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP”. Security Dialogue, 33(1), pp.9-26.
Christopher Hill “Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap” in John Peterson & Helene Sjursen (1998). A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP. London: Routledge, pp. 18-38.
David Allen “Who speaks for Europe?: The Search for an Effective and Coherent External Policy” in John Peterson & Helene Sjursen (1998). A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP. London: Routledge, pp.41-58.
Hüseyin Bağcı & Ali Yıldız (2004). “Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): From Confrontational to Cooperative Relationship” in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu & Seyfi Taşhan (eds.) (2004). The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls. Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, pp. 79-100.
Michael Emerson & Nathalie Tocci (2004). “Turkey as Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy”. CEPS, EU-Turkey Working Papers.
Meltem Müftüler-Bac (2000). “Turkey’s Role in the EU’s Foreign and Security Policies”. Security Dialogue, 31(4), pp.489-502.
Mustafa Aydın & Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe (2004). “To be or not to be with Turkey: December 2004 Blues for the EU”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 3(3), pp.47-58.
Özlem Terzi (2002). “New Capabilities, Old Relationships: Emergent ESDP and EU-Turkish Relations”. Southeast European Politics. 3(1), pp.43-61.