After the end of Cold War, the questions of whether NATO would continue its existence; if it continued what would be its new military strategy in regard of  evaluating threats; or whether it was possible or not for the formerly Eastern Bloc countries and especially for Russia to be a member of the organization, have been raised. Some of these questions have found their answers within the last decade. The goal of this presentation is to examine the enlargement process and its effects on the interests of Russia and Turkey in the post-Cold War era. In this respect, a brief history of Russia and NATO relations will be given and than how Turkey and Russia have been affected by this process will be analysed. At the conclusion, the future of the NATO expansion and its possible effectts will be evaluated.

NATO-Russia Relations After the Cold War

When the Cold War was over, NATO had 16 members. In 1991, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (which is going to be transformed to Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997) was established to call formerly socialist states for dialogue, partnership, and co-operation. The Partnership for Peace project was developped in 1994 and Russia, Eastern European countries, all the Central Asian and Caucasian countries (except Tajikistan), Slovenia, Finland, and Sweden got membership within the PfP project. The next step of relations with Russia came with the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, signed in Paris in 1997. Hereby, the Permanent Joint Council was established as a forum for regular consultation on common security issues.

To facilitate cooperation, a Russian Mission to NATO was established on 18 March 1998. Later on, a NATO Information Office in Moscow, a NATO Military Liaison Mission were established in Moscow to develop practical military cooperation between NATO military authorities and Russia's Ministry of Defence.

One of the most successful areas of NATO-Russia cooperation has been the joint commitment to promoting peace and stability in the Balkans. Troop reductions, left around 305 Russian soldiers serving in SFOR and some 650 Russian soldiers in KFOR, as of July 2002.

The attacks of September, 11 have changed the contemporary politics a lot. We have been witnesses of co-operating Russia and NATO or USA. Putin was the first president who called Bush after the attacks. Moreover, for the first time in the history, Russia opened her air space to USA, offered to share her information sources and to fight together against terrorism.

Certainly, Moscow did not stand against terrorism on USA’s war only because it was something anti-humanistic, but also through such a policy it could realize its objectives. The goal was about Chechnya. While acting behalf of the West in the terrorism combat, Russia might be able to demonstrate Chechen guerillas as terrorists and gain the world public opinion’s support in that subject. She intended to introduce Chechen opposers  as terrorists at a time when the whole world public opinion’s reaction toward terrorism was at the top-line and thus legitimize her actions. The operation model of USA, in which she attacked Afghanistan with the reason of harbouring the terrorists of Al- Qaeda, was desired by Russia to be applied to Georgia since they have supported Chechens. The US led anti-terrorism alliance has not only muted Western criticism of widespread human rights abuses in Chechnya but has also “turned a collective blind eye to Russia’s reassertion of control over Georgia.”

Within this atmosphere of “co-operation” for mutual interests, the Western world and Russia have agreed to deepen their dialogue. A new page was opened in NATO-Russia relations with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council at the NATO-Russia Summit on 28 May 2002 in Rome. The new Council, replacing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) which had been set up under the Founding Act, works on the principle of consensus. This distinguishes it from the PJC, in which positions on all issues among the 19 Allies were pre-coordinated before discussions with Russia.

Expansion

In the summit of 1994, expansion was accepted in principle and it is agreed to develop PfP. Nevertheless, there were three problems in front of expansion. Firstly, Russia was still opposing; secondly, which countries would be accepted as a member; and third question was how it would be financed. NATO authorities have tried to persuade Russia. In this meaning, it was guaranteed that nuclear weapons and new war units would not be emplaced in new member countries and that the nuclear strategy of NATO would not be changed. As a result, in June 1997 Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic were invited for membership to the summit in Madrid and they got member of NATO as of March 1999. In May 2004 at the Istanbul Summit, seven countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia –  have joined NATO. Nowadays, with her new pro-Western leader Yushenko, Ukrain seems to be the next probable new member.

Why does Russia oppose to the enlargement of NATO?

Kremlin is objecting the expansion first of all due to the heritage of the past. There has been a lack of trust between NATO and Russia for long years. The expansion of NATO is perceived by Moscow as “re-containment”, like a continuation of a Cold War habit.

Secondly, Russian Federation naturally does not want troops near her borders. Although Russian officials have been tried to get persuaded by NATO authorities that no war units would not be emplaced in the new members’ territory, Russia is hesitating since this promise may come to an end one day as new comers will appear.

Loss of arms market in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries is third reason for Moscow’s opposition. During the Cold War years CEE countries were obtaining their arms from Russia, their great ally. This was one of the major resources of revenue for Kremlin. As NATO is a military alliance, it is expected that the members of it would make the arms trade intra-alliance. Russia is anxious to lose her arms trade partners.

Fourth, “Near Abroad Doctrin” was announced in 1993 and has been registered by 2000 with the Military Doctrine of Russia. According to this doctrine, the former USSR countries were a vital sphere of influence for Russia in a sense of  both economics and  security. This doctrine has three pillars: Operating the economy which was diffused throughout former USSR, not to have snatched the influence of this less developed region with huge energy resources to great states, protecting the Russian diaspora in these countries.

As for the expansion in 1999, those countries were formerly Eastern Block called countries. However this time NATO was expanding to Baltics, where the countries were formerly republics of USSR. This was a violence of the Russian Military and Near Abroad doctrines. Besides, the number of people speaking Russian language is quite high in this region which was against the third pillar of the doctrines.

Preventing further expansions is the fifth cause and a continuation of the fourth. If Moscow does not react to these expansion enough, new inclusions may also occur. But there is no doubt that new inclusions will more involve in Russia’s future. If the enlargement of NATO gets into the Black See region (Ukraine, Moldova) or the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Georgia) not only the third but also first and second pillars of the doctrine, which are related with economy and more vital interests of the country, will be spoiled.

Why are Cauacasus and Black See so important for Russia? First of all, the oil reserves such as Baku, Grozni and Maykop are here. Secondly the ways for Russia to sell her energy resources pass this geography, the pipelines opening to West are here. Thirdly, in the past Black Sea used to be a Sowiet see. (Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine were her allies and Russia could use their harbors as it wanted.) but now the Black Sea is about being a European see.  Furthermore, NATO´s possible deeming enlargement to Ukraine, which is also a former USSR republic, irritates Russia even more than the expansion to the Baltics, due to strategic importance of Black Sea, as Russia has its greatest seaforce in Ukraine. Moreover, North Caucasus is the only way for Russia for opening to the Black Sea and from here to the rest of the world. As last but not least, Black see and Caspian See coasts supply the wheat and maize needs of Russia. So, as we see Russia has plenty of reasons to oppose the further enlargement of NATO into Black See and Caucasus. 

The last but not the least reason is the plan of “Pro-Western energy corridor” of the western world, which will abolish the transport monopoly of Russia within the region and the economic dependence of S. Caucasian and Central Asian countries on Russia. Of course, this not a case that Russia would approve. In regard of waylaying this plan, Russia does not want more pro-Western countries near her borders.

Effects of Expansion on Turkey in the Post-cold War Era

What about the actions of Turkey regarding expansion? Generally, the expansion is encouraged by Turkey. As for the first expansion to Eastern Europe, namely Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic, it is not very directly related with Turkish interests, but it can be regarded as the initial step of a long way and it can be counted as important for her, as it has lead further expansion.

The second expansion has crucial importance for Turkey. First of all, if we consider the Western boundries of Turkey, both Greece and Bulgaria are now allies of Turkey. The inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria has increased the stability and co-operation in Black See which is a pleasing situation for her. From this point of view, the further expansion, an expansion after the new 7s is more important for Turkish interests.(If we leave the most possible, Macedonia, Albania and Croatia aside) The next possible members of NATO can be Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.  Most importantly, new inclusions near Turkish borders is lessening the the “flank country” feature of Turkey. This expansion, if it occurs, will be really beneficial for Turkish interests also in Black See in decreasing the influence of Russia in both of the regions, while increasing that of Turkey. This situation will make the possibility of an agreement for the pipelines within these countries in the region more probable. As mentioned before, Western countries are planning to build an energy corridor from east to west to carry the energy resources. It is also desired that the carrier states should be pro-Western and do not cause problems. With the support of NATO in their backs, the Caucasus countries may realize the policies which in fact they are willing to persue in order either to decrease the impact of Russia over their countries or to engage in more profitable projects.

How should Turkey react?

How would Turkey react to an expansion to this region? Firstly, Turkey has good relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan. These countries are known to be pro-Western and Turkey is constituing a role model for them. Their inclusion in NATO would be strategically useful for Turkey, in that it decreasas the vulnerability of her. Secondly, Turkey has pipeline agreements with these countries and desires to break the Russian monopoly. Ankara wants to increase the variety of energy resources within the region. Another point is her willingness to maintain the security of the energy supply resources. Also, she wants to appear as one of the most important consumption and transit terminals in Caucasus. Thirdly, the East-West Energy corridor plan is suitable to the interests of three parties, to those of Caucasian countries, Turkey and NATO. On the contrary, the inclusion of this area within NATO may lead Russia to act more aggresively. This is the other side of the coin which should be considered deliberately.  What should Turkey do?

First of all, we know that Turkey had suffered badly from the East-West tension during the Cold War.  Being a flank country, 18 of the 19 possible NATO action plans were including Turkey. This shows both the significance of her within the allience and the hard conditions in which she was. Like other countries within the region Turkey can never take the risk of such a confrontation again. Therefore, NATO- Russia rapprochment is in her favour and she should try to hinder new polarizations to emerge.

The second thing we again know is that the expansion of NATO is not supported by Russia and this situation is hampering a dialogue between them. The third parameter is that the expansion would be in favour of both Turkey and NATO. Then what should be done is appearing: helping carrying out the expansion while decreasing the tension. However, this is not an easy nut to crack. To decrease the tension of Russia, its losses should be met with new gains in both economic and political terms. Turkey can play a crucial role in economic relations. By increasing the efficiency of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation, the losses of Russia may be lessened under the understanding of win-win. For instance, new aggreements regarding the trade, pipelines, and the usage of harbours in Black Sea can be signed. As claimed by a famous researcher, “red lines may be replaced by pipelines”. This economic co-operation may also help reducing the re-containment perception of Russia in some degree. Nevertheless, the political worries of Russia cannot be covered only with the efforts of Turkey. Here, a three-dimensional co-operation is necessary; Russia, NATO, and the countries in the region. Turkey can play a substantial role in arranging the ground of such a trialogue. Within this context, Turkey should evaluate the situation in she is carefully and immediately constitute a policy regarding the further expansion of NATO in this region.

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