Putin’s visit to Turkey is one of the most important overseas visits of the recent years. For decades Turkey-Russia relations have been built on a basis of artificial conflicts. Today, we cast aside that model. Those were the words of foreign policy adviser Sergey Prihodko, one of the few people that can influence President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation. The expressions Prihodko used when assessing Turkish-Russian relations are significant in that these indicate the way Russia’s Turkey policy has evolved and the point that has been reached.
Putin’s visit to Turkey the main frame of which was constructed on the basis of the “Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia” had been planned long ago. In fact, it was supposed to have taken place in 2002. The visit had to be postponed when, all of a sudden, the Ecevit Government decided to stage a snap election. Afterwards, there was talk to the effect that the visit would take place in early 2003; however, that time too the visit could not take place because the chairman of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) was not prime minister. Later, Erdogan did become prime minister but this time too the visit was postponed because the price of the Russian “Blue Stream” natural gas was put on the bargaining table and tensions flared all of a sudden in Turkish-Russian relations. Then a new date was set for the planned visit: September 1994. However, when the tragic Beslan incident happened, Putin postponed the visit.
The first official head-of-state-level visit between Turkey and Russia (not counting the official visit Nikolai Podgorni had paid to Ankara in 1972, that is, at a time Leonid Brezhnev prevailed on the Soviet Union as the first secretary of the Communist Party while Podgorni held a symbolic position as the chairman of the Supreme Soviet) finally took place on Dec. 5-6, 2004. Boris Yeltsin had come to Turkey to attend various international meetings --such as the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSE) meeting in 1999— without actually paying Turkey an official visit. So, Putin was the first Russian head of state to visit Turkey officially. He was accompanied by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko, President Mintimer Shaimiyev of the Tatarstan Republic of the Russian Federation and President Murat Zyazikov of Ingushetia.
The Putin visit that took place shortly after the latest date was decided upon –although coming after such a long time— is highly important both for the Russian foreign policy and for Turkey in various aspects. The Russian side especially attached great importance to the visit, striving to ensure that it would go well beyond a protocol visit and lead to concrete agreements.
In the wake of the Putin visit an account of the visit is now being taken by the Turkish public opinion and at various other platforms. What had been expected? Which agreements have been concluded? What is the balance? Heated discussions are taking place on such questions. We believe that the most important aspect of this visit is that such a visit has taken place. In the course of top-level visits between two countries, the signing of agreements on a project basis would not be expected anyway. The important thing would be the signing of “framework agreements”. And that was accomplished during the Putin visit.
Russia (who has merely watched on as the USA set up one military base after another in Central Asia in the wake of the Sept. 11, failed to prevent the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that will be completed by June 2005, been unable to prevent the “velvetization” of the revolution in Georgia, lost ground in Abkhazia, and, in the latest instance, suffered a loss in the crisis in Ukraine) now needs to get along with Turkey better and to cooperate with Turkey in Eurasia. Similarly, the Russian option is becoming increasingly important on Ankara’s agenda since Turkey has entered into a difficult process with the European Union. Entering into cooperation with Russia even at a regional level would strengthen Turkey’s hand in this tough period of struggling with the EU though Russia cannot be an alternative to the EU.
The Putin visit came prior to Dec. 17, causing attention to focus on this issue during a period that has seen sporadic flare-ups of tension in relations with the EU. It must be noted that that was a coincidence, a pleasant one. Coming at a time our relationship with the EU is going through such a sensitive period the Putin visit caused assessment of Turkey-EU and Turkey-Russia relations in a new framework. The Eurasian option has begun to be debated in the face of potential negative decisions of the EU. Assessing this kind of phenomena in the same framework and perceiving them as one another’s alternative might cause us to reach wrong conclusions. It would be out of the question for Turkey to make a choice between the EU and Russia. These are different phenomena. Neither the EU could be Russia’s alternative nor a Eurasian union that might be formed with Russia could be presented as an alternative to the EU.
Meanwhile, Russia’s relations with the West are quite good though certain problems crop up from time to time. The rapprochement achieved between Russia and a number of EU countries –France, Germany and Italy especially—has gone well beyond the relationship Turkey has formed with these countries. Therefore, although it is being claimed that Russia is trying to create a union in Eurasia, Russia has opted for the goal of rapprochement with the West just as Turkey has done. On the other hand, Russia does aim to enter into “warmer” cooperation in the region with China and India and thus counterbalance the USA in the region in some manner.
One could cite among the main results of the Putin visit the following: The “deepened multidimensional partnership” developed with Russia will be creating new opportunities in the Caucasus and Central Asia where we had been competing with one another. And, from now on, relationships will be carried out with a new understanding in Eurasia. Thanks to this visit the two countries are about to overcome the perception problem that is a major obstacle between them. (That is a problem that exists more extensively in the Russian side than in the Turkish side.) With this visit, Russia has just begun to discover Turkey, a country from whom Russia has subconsciously kept a distance due to the perception problem though Turkey is situated right beside Russia geographically.
Until now the official relations between the two countries have lagged behind the efforts made by businessmen. This visit is expected to lead to a significant reactivation of the official relations. For the first time there is an opportunity to render operant an inter-institutional cooperation mechanism that is very important in inter-state relations.
Talks focused on the following issues during President Putin’s visit:
- The Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia
- Cooperation in the field of energy
- Construction of pipelines that would constitute an alternative to the Turkish Straits route
- Issues of economic cooperation
- New Russian proposals for investments mainly involving energy
- The helicopter tender and military cooperation
- The Caucasus and regional issues
- Cooperation against terrorism
The Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia
As two sovereign powers of Eurasia, Turkey and the Russian Federation have always had relations plagued by rivalry and struggles. Both during the reign of the Tsarist Russia and later during the period of the Soviet Union who was one of the main actors of the Cold War, these two countries perceived one another as a threat and a rival. In the course of that struggle the two countries had “hot” wars during the imperial period and “cold:” wars in the 20th Century. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union the hope that the struggle in question would come to an end was born. However, that hope died soon. The two countries entered into a new competition to further their respective interests in Eurasia, striving for supremacy.
This struggle continued until the early 2000’s, doing the two countries more harm than good in reality. Meanwhile, other countries benefited from that struggle, achieving big gains in the region.
The Sept. 11 attack was a significant factor that made Turkey and the Russian Federation to become aware of this situation. There arose in both countries new ideas and the desire to push into the foreground potential areas of cooperation rather than competing with one another. For the first time the two countries put on record and “undersigned” these new ideas, embracing multidimensional cooperation instead of competition. With this aim Turkish and Russian foreign ministers, Ismail Cem and Igor Ivanov, signed in New York on Nov. 16, 2001 the Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia (From Bilateral Cooperation to Multidimensional Partnership).
A rationale along the following lines was given to justify the signing of the document in question: “The changes of historic import taking place in the world have opened up for the relationship between Russia and Turkey a new era characterized by the opportunities that would be put to good use to develop productive bilateral and regional cooperation in all fields in the spirit of friendship and mutual trust. Russia and Turkey are determined to make extra efforts to carry their relationship to the level of enhanced constructive partnership.”
Unfortunately, time passed and the aforementioned document signed by the foreign ministers failed to receive from the diplomats the attention it deserved. In other words the “Action Plan” had to wait until it would be tackled during a higher-level visit. That historic opportunity was recaptured when President Putin arrived in Turkey for an official (Dec. 5-6) visit.
Cooperation in the Field of Energy and Natural Gas Projects
Work has been done on the details of the “Energy Cooperation Protocol” envisaged to be signed during Putin’s visit. Russian energy giant Gazprom that controls on its own Russia’s natural gas exports has displayed an interest in investment projects in various fields in Turkey. These include construction of natural gas conversion stations and power plants, local natural gas networks and underground natural gas storage facilities (Tuz Golu). Russia has articulated its intention to set up a natural gas storage facility at the Ceyhan port as well.
Also discussed was the possibility of exporting natural gas to Europe and Israel via the Blue Stream route. During Putin’s visit the Tatneft-Tupras issue –that has met with the “courtroom obstacle” in Turkey-- too was raised. Putin repeatedly underlined that issue with special emphasis during the talks he held in Turkey.
Russia had a warm reaction to Turkey’s plans to set up a nuclear plant, plans that had been disclosed earlier. Drawing attention to the Russian experience in that field Russian Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko announced that Russia was offering to construct that plant.
Turkish Straits and Alternative Pipelines
Although, in Turkish-Russian relations “energy cooperation” has been perceived merely as Ankara buying natural gas from Russia, now for the first time there is the possibility of the two countries constructing a pipeline together for oil shipments. Thus, the Turkish Straits issue that had been a perennial problem between the two countries during the time of the Tsarist Russia and the Soviet era will be tackled on a project basis and maybe the Straits that have always been problematic will be turned into a field of cooperation for the first time.
For this reason, the issue of bypassing the Straits was one of the main items on the agenda. However, the “indecision” displayed on this issue since the beginning prevented progress. Initially the Russians reacted warmly to the Trans-Thracian route that had been suggested with priority. Later, the rising environmentalist concerns in Turkey caused Russia to “withdraw” from that route since Russia, having greater expectations of some other tenders in Turkey, did not want to become involved in such quarrels. Meanwhile, an alternative route was suggested by the government circles: the Samsun-Ceyhan route. Russia did not react favorably to that proposal due to geopolitical concerns. Similarly, it turned out that certain circles in Turkey feared that the suggested route could constitute an alternative to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) route.
With the energy sources in the Caspian basin joining the grid the tanker traffic through the Turkish Straits increases to a level well beyond what the Straits can endure. This situation is pushing Russia (who wants to increase its oil exports) and Turkey (who is worried about that) to seek different alternatives on this issue. However, it must not be forgotten that Turkey is not the only alternative when it comes to bypassing the Straits. Russia has been working on ten different alternatives on this issue. Last month Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov visited Bulgaria and, after that, Russia, Bulgaria and Greece signed a protocol for a Burgaz-Dedeagac (Alexandroupolis) pipeline. This has boosted that route’s chances over the proposed Turkey route. In the latest instance, during Putin’s visit to Ankara Greek Prime Minister announced, “This pipeline is a top priority issue for Greece” and shortly after that he paid Moscow a three-day visit. These developments are significant in that they indicate the level the “alternatives involving pipelines outside Turkey” has reached. Russia still has not managed to “arrive at a definite result” regarding the potential routes that would bypass the Turkish Straits. Under the circumstances, during the coming days Russia is expected to make a reassessment of all alternatives, the BTC among them, for its oil shipments.
Economic Relations
Turkey and the Russian Federation who, as two neighboring countries, have the kind of economic structures that complement one another, have great potential to expand their economic relations. Yet, these relations have still not been raised to the desired level. Statistics make this all too clear. Also, there is an imbalance in the field of bilateral trade. The trade deficit has kept growing to the detriment of Turkey. The Turkish side raised that issue during Putin’s visit. However, Putin himself replied by saying that in reality there was no such “imbalance”, that though the trade balance seemed to be tipping towards Russia, in reality Turkish revenues from Turkish contractors’ activities in Russia, the “suitcase trade” and tourism, bridged that ostensible deficit.
The trade volume was planned to be some $10 billion as of the end of 2004. The aim is to raise that figure to $25 billion in three years. The dynamic development witnessed in the realm of Turkish-Russian trade is, in reality, dictating that the problems experienced in political relations should be overcome.
Military Relations
The developing military relations and the Turkish arms market, especially the helicopter tender that was put on the agenda by Putin, constitute another important subject. For this reason Putin brought with him Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, the person he refers to as “the man I trust most in Russia.” During the visit the following issues were discussed: sale of Russian-made weapons, military technical vehicles, equipment and ammunition to Turkey, joint production of weapons and military technical vehicles, and joint production and potential sale to third countries of the Ka-50-2 Kamov (Erdogan) type attack helicopters that have been developed together with Russia and Israel.
Caucasus and Regional Rivalry
The Caucasus topped the list of the regional issues tackled in the course of the bilateral talks. In this framework, the two sides discussed the recent surge of tension in Georgia, the Georgia-Turkey and Georgia-Russia relations, the Nagorno Karabagh problem, the Ukrainian crisis, the NATO activities in the Caucasus and the latest situation in Iraq. Ankara and Moscow had pursued similar policies during the Iraq War and the talks with Putin on this subject amounted to an “exchange of views” and “agreement”.
Cooperation against Terrorism
The problems experienced in the Caucasus –including the Chechnya issue-- caused the tension to rise from time to time during the talks. Hardly having proved successful regarding the Chechens, Putin made “clear” demands on this issue during his talks in Ankara. He asked for restriction of the activities of a number of nongovernmental organizations that are supported by Turkish nationals of Caucasian origin and sought stricter measures against certain extremist groups whose members allegedly go to Chechnya –by way of Georgia-- to fight. Turkey, in turn, asked for restriction of the activities in Russia of the PKK followers and sympathizers and sought an end to the support certain groups in Duma extend to these circles.
In reality, regarding cooperation against terrorism, the legal infrastructure required had already been created between Turkey and Russia and “adequate” agreements had been signed. It was in 1992 that the two countries signed the first agreement to join hands in the struggle against terrorism. Later the “Memorandum on Cooperation in the Field of Combating Terrorism” was signed in 1996 and the “Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Struggle against Terrorism” in 1999.
The joint political declaration issued during Putin’s visit to Turkey referred to the Turkish-Russian cooperation against terrorism and other threats as a priority subject for multidimensional bilateral cooperation. In fact, the “Chechen” operations staged by the Turkish police prior to the visit had prepared the ground for the cooperation to be carried out in this direction.
Cyprus/OIC/WTO
On the Cyprus issue Turkey has sought support and close cooperation from Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Kremlin who had traditionally maintained a pro-Greek Cypriot stance on the Cyprus issue made a change in that policy for the first time during the OIC meeting in Istanbul, establishing direct contact with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) in an unprecedented manner. Turkey asked Russia to make efforts on the Cyprus issue more actively. Russia, in turn, sought support from Turkey for its attempt to gain observer status at the OIC. Similarly, Putin sought Turkish support for the efforts Moscow has been making since quite a long time to become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The following agreements were signed during the visit:
- The Joint Declaration on the Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership between Turkey and the Russian Republic
- The Military Cooperation Agreement for Preventing Dangerous Incidents Beyond the Territorial Waters
- The Agreement for the Mutual Protection of the Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights in Exchanges between Turkey and the Russian Federation in the Framework of the Bilateral Military Technical Cooperation
- The Framework Agreement for Cooperation between Botas and Gazprom
- Memorandum on Cooperation between the Strategic Studies Center of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Diplomacy Academy
- Trilateral Cooperation Protocol between Turkish Eximbank, Russian Eximbank and Gunes Ekonombank
Conclusion
Putin’s visit is of a historic nature. This is because with this visit for the first time an opportunity to launch new initiatives in Central Asia has been caught and the accumulated problems have been taken up with a new approach. The fact that the visit was mainly of an economic nature could attract Russian investors to Turkey and pave the way for further development of Turkish-Russian economic relations. The “The Joint Declaration on the Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership between Turkey and the Russian Republic” signed by President Sezer and President Putin is important from the standpoint of activating the Action Plan. In fact, this declaration is based on the Cooperation in Eurasia Plan signed in New York on Nov. 16, 2001 by the Turkish and Russian foreign ministers of the time (Ismail Cem and Igor Ivanov). It even amounts to an extension of that document – that has, until now, remained on the dusty shelves at the foreign ministries of the two countries though politicians have referred to it from time to time. Probably for the first time with this visit this document will gain a serious nature and become functional. Also, this visit turned out to be an important opportunity to reactivate the institutional dialogues between the two countries, dialogues that had not been functioning extensively in reality.
Since such a high-level visit has taken place after a long time naturally the two countries put on the agenda a wide range of issues. On most of the issues tackled during the visit progress was made to the benefit of both countries.
The significance of this visit goes well beyond the progress achieved on actual issues. Thanks to the highest-level rapprochement achieved between the two countries bilateral relations have gained enhanced multidimensional partnership status and thanks to this direct contact the “perception” problem has been overcome.
1 “Vladimir Putin Sovershil Dva Vizita, Odin iz Kotorih Istoricheskiy, a Drugoy Strategicheskiy”, Tribuna, Dec. 7, 2004.
2 Russian bureaucrats whom we have talked with from time to time stressed that during that visit Putin wanted to sign important agreements. For that reason they put on the agenda various alternatives in an effort to draft agreements special to that occasion.
3 In this context one should not ignore the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church views in a cold light the proposed bestowment upon the spiritual leader of the Orthodox Church the title “ecumenical” at a time the West tries to impose that. This is an issue on which heated debates are taking place in Turkey these days. It must not be forgotten that Turkey can enter into cooperation with Russia on this issue.
4 Just as Turkey, Russia does not react warmly anyway to the Turkish-Russian alliance against the West project (to put it differently, the Muslim-Russian alliance project) the foundations of which had been laid by Cemaleddin Afgani, a project that has found followers in Turkey from time to time.
5 “Moscow, Athens, Agree to Build Pipeline”, RIA Novosti, Dec. 10, 2004.
6 Aydin Mehtiyev, “Cherez 3 goda Tovarooborat Mejdu Rossiey i turtsii Dostignet 25 Milyard Dollarov”, strana 30, 2004.
7 “12 Chechensev v Stambule Nahodyatsya Pod Strajey”, Kommsersant, Dec. 4, 2004.
8 “Rossiya i Turtsiya Podpisali Deklaratsiyu o Druzhbe”, Itar-Tass, Dec. 6, 2004.